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conclusion that there was not a reasonable probability of the desired
rezoning being realized and had added nothing to the compensation
on the ground of possible rezoning. p. 22.
The Court of Appeal ([1961] O.R. 783, at 800, 801) wrestled
with the problem of trying to express in percentage terms the "nega-
tive value" of zoning restrictions in force at the time of expropriation
and affecting the land in question. It is submitted that this may be
taken as an indication that the principles underlying valuation are
not quite so simple and straightforward as would seem desirable.
With a view to some type of construction, probably consonant
with permitted zoning uses, the owner had some soil sampling tests
carried out and sketches and architects plans prepared, and had ob-
tained cost-estimates on the proposed motel. Because of the expro-
priation, all these plans were abandoned.
In trying to arrive at the "value to the owner" it seems pointless
to try to determine the sum of money which the owner, as a prudent
man, at the moment of expropriation would have paid for the land
rather than be deprived of it, as required by the Woods test, because
it is virtually impossible to ban from the mind the awareness of
actual facts, namely that expropriation has taken place. It is equally
unhelpful for this purpose to direct the tribunal to take into consid-
eration the probability or even the possibility of the rescission of any
by-law restricting the use to which the property may be put. These
latter considerations are certainly important factors for the deter-
mination of "market value".
However, it is submitted that the "value to the owner" must mean
what he thinks he can get for his land. This entails the use to which
he thinks he can put the land sooner or later, and his willingness to
await favourable conditions.
The case was remitted to the Ontario Municipal Board to be dealt
with in accordance with the directions of the Supreme Court.
Standish Hall Hotel Incorporated v. The Queen, [1963] S.C.R. 64.
Her Majesty in right of Canada expropriated the appellant's
property which included a hotel. After holding the title for 22 months,
the Crown abandoned most of the property which revested in the
former owner. The appellant had meanwhile, with consent of the
Crown, remained in possession of the property, and continued to
carry on its business there paying no rent.
The rule in a case of this nature seems quite simple. The value
of the land is assessed as of the date of expropriation, and as well at
the date of revesting. The latter figure is then subtracted from the
former, and, subject to certain adjustments, the difference is the
amount of compensation to which the owner is entitled (Gibb v. The
King, [1918] A.C. 915). So far so good. However, in practice the facts
do not always lend themselves to the application of this simple formula.
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In the instant case the Standish Hall Hotel had shortly before
the expropriation been severely damaged by fire. The owner, though
at first planning an extensive reconstruction and modernization, con-
fined himself to temporary repairs in view of the expropriation and
in anticipation of having to vacate the premises in the near future.
The value to the owner in this case involves not just the relatively
small parcel finally retained by the Crown, but also the effects of the
expropriation of the entire property which governed the appellant's
conduct and his business policy for a period of 22 months. When he
found himself with title once more, he claimed (among other heads)
compensation for the loss of profits which he would undoubtedly have
made, had not the temporary expropriation taken place.
There was evidence to show that when news of the expropriation
of the Standish Hall Hotel spread, other hotels in the immediate neigh-
bourhood took steps to secure for themselves the business of the
appellant's "orphaned customers". How can this fact find expression
in the compensation based on the "value to the owner"?
The majority allowed the appellant $25,000 for business disloca-
tion. Kerwin C.J. in his dissenting judgment would not make any
allowance for loss of business as the appellant never attempted to
move its business (p. 68). Locke J., the other dissenting judge, states
at p. 83: "In my opinion, if there was any loss of profits during the
period of 22 months the appellant had no claim for compensation,
since such loss was occasioned by its voluntary act in remaining in
possession rent-free during the period. If there was any legal basis
for such a claim, I consider that the evidence does not support any
award."
Fraser v. The Queen [1963], S.C.R. 455.
In this case, Her Majesty in right of Canada expropriated 12.8
acres of what, for all purposes but one, was waste land and offered
compensation of $50 per acre. The land itself was not required for
the purposes of the project. However, the area expropriated consisted
substantially of a particular kind of rock which due to its proximity
to the site of the proposed Canso Causeway was the ideal building
material for the project.
It was essentially because building material had been expropri-
ated, albeit in the form of land, that the majority allowed the appeal.
In fact, one of the grounds of appeal was that the learned trial judge
had failed to give sufficient weight to the value of the special adapta-
bility of the land for the causeway construction. The Respondent on
the other hand contended that as the value of the property was solely
and exclusively related to the scheme of constructing the causeway,
this consideration should have been excluded, since this would be an
evaluation to the taker, rather than to the dispossessed. "It is well
settled that compensation for the compulsory acquisition of land can-
not include an increase in value which is entirely due to the scheme
1964]
